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A STUDY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL LAW
By Roy MO RLAND* AND ROBERT E. HATTON, JR.**
The report of the Committee on Criminal Law, adopted at
the 1935 annual meeting of the Kentucky State Bar Association,
urged the passage of the following sections from the American
Law Institute's Model Code :'
238. Right to try where offense committed within State.
282. Number of peremptory challenges.
308. Appointment of expert witnesses by Court.
309. Fees for expert witnesses.
312. Trial where joint defendants, and a provision taken from the
Michigan Statute that "alibi or insanity be pleaded in advance."S
It is the purpose of this paper to examine in detail each
provision and to discuss each from the standpoint of feasibility
and effectiveness.
I.
RIGiT TO TRY WHERE OF-sE CommITTED WITH STATE.
"Any person who commits within this state an offense against this
state, whether he is within or without the state at the time of its
commission, may be tried in this state."
This provision is intended to reach situations where part
of the act occurs within one state and part in another. It is not
limited in its scope to crimes of violence but extends to crimes
unaccompanied by physical force, such as conspiracy, extortion
and others. It has been urged that such a provision would
result in a dispute over jurisdiction between the states in which
the component parts of the crime occurred, and increased cost.
Far from this, it is the belief of the writers that it will tend to
eliminate disputes and cut down costs. If the alleged criminal
*Roy Moreland, A. B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL. B., "with
distinction," University of Kentucky College of Law, 1923; J. D., Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, 1928. Professor of Law, Universit? of
Kentucky College of Law; contributor to various legal periodicals.
** Robert B. Hatton, Jr., A. B., Marshall College, 1925; I.. B., Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law, 1935.
2Proc. Ky. State Bar Association (1935), p. 161.
2Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), Sections 17313, 17314.
3L Ii. J.--4
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is in either state then that state, having such a provision, could
punish him and thus obviate the necessity of costly rendition
proceedings.
As between counties such a provision already exists.3
It is believed that such a statute is not open to objection
upon the ground of constitutionality. Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides: "In prosecutions by indictment or in-
formation, he shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the vicinage."
Eight states, Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin, having consti-
tutional provisions almost identical with our own 4 have passed
and upheld the following statute: "The following persons are
liable to punishment under the laws of this State,-all persons.
who commit in whole or in part any crime within this State." 5
Wisconsin's Statute differs somewhat: "Whenever a person,
with intent to commit a crime, does any act, or omits to do any
act within this State in execution, or part execution of such
intent which culminates in the commission of a crime, either
within or without this State, such person is punishable for such
crime in this State in the same manner as if the same had been
committed entirely within this State.'"'
Seven other states having constitutional provisions sub-
stantially similar to Kentucky's have passed like statutes extend-
ing the scope of their jurisdiction,7 but two of these, Texas and
Vermont, are identical in result to that of Arizona.
8Ky. Crim. Code, Sec. 21: "If an offense be committed partly in
one and partly in another county, or if acts and their effects con-
stituting an offense occur in different counties, the jurisdiction is in
either county."
"Ariz., Const., 1892, Art. II, Sec. 24, "In which the offense is alleged
to have been committed"; Minn., Const., 1857, Art. I, Sec. 6, "County
or district wherein the crime shall have been committed"; Mont.,
Const., 1889, Art. III, See. 16 (same as Minn.); Okla., Const., 1907,
Art. II, Sec. 20 (same); S. D., Const., 1889, Art. VI, Sec. 7 (same);
Utah, Const., 1895, Art. I, Sec. 12, also Art. VIII, Sec 5; Wash., Const.,
1889, Art. I, See. 22 (like Ariz.); Wisc., Const., 1848, Art. I, Sec. 7
(like Minn., except that "offense" is used instead of "crime".4 Ariz., Rev. Code, 1928, Sec. 4490; Minn., Gen. Stat., 1923, See.
9909 (1); Mont., Rev. Code, 1921, Sec. 10730 (1); Okla., Stat., 1931,
Sec. 1796 (1); S. D., Comp. Laws, 1929, See. 3582 (1)-see also See.
4505; Utah, Rev. Stat., 1933, Sec. 103-1-41 (1); Wash., Pierce's Code,
1929, See. 8689 (1).
OWisc., Stat., 1933, Sec. 353.29.
SCalif., Pen. Code, 1931, Sec. 27 (1); Idaho, Code, 1932, Sec. 17-202;
Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1929, Sec. 9951; New York, Bender's Penal Law,
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In complicated crime situations in which the constituent acts
of the crime occur in different states, to assert that the authority
of a state over a crime ends at the state line is of no aid in set-
tling jurisdictional questions. The modern criminal has little
concern for political boundaries except insofar as they may aid in
effecting his criminal purpose. Legislatures recognizing this are
evidencing an unmistakable trend away from the strictly terri-
torial concept of criminal jurisdiction and beginning to approach
the problem from a more realistic angle. Public sentiment and
the general safety demand that the territorial concept be liberal-
ized to meet the requirements of the new era in criminal
operation.
II.
NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
It is recommended that Sections 203 and 204 of the Ken-
tucky Criminal Code relating to the number of peremptory
challenges be repealed and that Section 282 of the Model Code
herein set out be adopted:
"The Commonwealth and the defendant shall each be allowed the
following number of peremptory challenges: (a) Ten, if the offense
charged is punishable by death or imprisonment for life. (b) Six, if
the offense charged is a felony not punishable by death or imprison-
ment for life. (c) Three, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor."
Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginias
alone of all the states, allow the defendant more than twice the
number of peremptory challenges allowed the Commonwealth.
There seems to be no valid reason for such disparity. The
modern trend in criminal procedure is to place the defendant
and Commonwealth on equal terms. Responsive to this trend
the legislatures of 24 states have equalized the number of per-
1931, Sec. 1930; Texas, Baldwin Code Cr. Proc., 1926, Art. 193; North
Dakota, Comp. Laws, 1913, Sec. 9206 _1); Vermont, Session Laws, 1925,
p. 164.
8Ky., Cr. Code, 1932, Sees. 203, 204 (defendant 15, Commonwealth
5 in case of felony, 3 each in case of misdemeanor); X. C., Code, 1927,
Sec. 4833-4 (defendant 12, Commonwealth 4 in capital offenses, defend-
ant 4, Commonwealth 2 in all other offenses); Tenn., Code, 1932, Sec.
10020 (defendant 15, Commonwealth 6 in capital cases, defendant 8,
Commonwealth 4 in all other felony cases, defendant 3, Commonwealth
3 in misdemeanors); W. Va., Code, 1931, Ch. 62, Art. 3, Sec. 3 (in cases
of felony jurors struck off from panel of 20. Defendant 6, state 2, no
other kind of peremptory challenges).
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emptory challenges allowed in all cases.9 Five more discrimi-
nate only in capital cases or certain, few specified crimes.10
Three more discriminate only in offenses punishable by death
or life imprisonment."
The constitutionality of such a provision seems hardly
open to serious question. The provisions in the constitutions
of all of these states correspond to our own Section 7. "The
ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred and the right
I California, Penal Code, 1931, Sec. 1070 (20 each if punishable by
death, 10 each otherwise); Colorado, Mills Anne. Stat., 1928, Sec. 4257
(15 each if capital offense, 10 each otherwise); Connecticut, Gen. Stat.,
1930, See. 6478 (25 each if capital, 15 each if punishable by life im-
prisonment, 8 each if punishable by imprisonment in State Pen., 4
each in all other cases); Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws, 1927, Sec. 8303 (10
if capital, 8 other felonies, 3 misdemeanors); Idaho, Code 1932, Sec.
19-1916 (10 each if capital, 6 otherwise); Illinois, Cahill's Rev. Stat.,
1933, Ch. 38, Sec. 765 (20 if capital or life, 10 if imprisonment over
18 mos., 6 all other offenses); Indiana, Burn's Ind. Stat., 1933, Sees.
9-1502, 9-1503 (20 each if capital, 10 if puishable by state prison, 3
otherwise); Iowa, Code, 1931, Sec. 13836 (8 if capital or punishable
with life, 4 in other felonies or certafn misdemeanors, 2 in other mis-
demeanors); Louisianna, Code Cr. Proc., 1932, Art. 354 (12 if capital,
6 otherwise); Massachusetts, Gen. Laws, 1932, Ch. 234, Sec. 29 (12 if
capital or life, 2 otherwise); Mississippi, Code, 1930, Sec. 1277 (12 if
capital, 6 otherwise); Montana, Rev. Code, 1921, Sec. 11955, Supp. 1927,
Sec. 11956 (10 if death or life, 8 if unlimited sentence, 6 if limited to
a year); Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1929, Sec. 10942 (8 if capital or life,
4 otherwise); New York, Code, Cr. Proc., 1931, Sec. 373 (20 if capital,
20 if more than 10 years, 5 in all others); North Dakota, Sess. Laws,
1927, p. 373, See. 10804-5 (20 if first degree murder, 10 if term in pen,
6 all others); Ohio, Code, 1932, Secs. 13443-46 (6 each In capital cases,
4 each in other cases). (In 1930 Ohio allowed defendant 16 and state
only 4.); Oklahoma, Stat., 1931, Sec. 2993 (9 if capital, 5 if punish-
able in state prison, 3 in others); Pennsylvania, West Stat., 1920,
Sec. 8158, 20 each; South Dakota, Comp. Laws, 1929, See. 4853 (20 if
capital or life, 10 if state prison, 3 in all other cases); Texas, Code Cr.
Proc., 1925, Art. 615 (15 capital), Art. 634 (10 if non-capital); Utah,
Rev. Stat., 1933, Sec. 105-31-15 (10 if capital or life imprisonment, 4 in
other felonies, 3 in misdemeanors); Vermont, Gen. Laws, 1917, Sees.
2252-3 (6 each); Virginia, Code, 1930, See. 4898 (4 if felony, 1 if mis-
demeanor); Washington, Pierce's Code, 1929, Sec. 9365, (12 If capital,
6 if penitentiary offense, 3 otherwise).
''Delaware, Sess. Laws, 1918-19, p. 633, Sec. 4822 (6 each if non-
cap. offense); New Hampshire, Pub. Laws, 1926, Ch. 368, Sees. 11, 12
(3 each in non-cap. offense); New Jersey, Comp. Stat., 1910 Cr. Pr.,
Sees. 80, 81 (10 each except in case of treason, murder, misprison of
treason, manslaughter, sodomy, rape, arson, burglary, forgery, perjury,
or subornation of perjury); Wisconsin, Stat., 1933, Sec. 35703 (12 each
if non-cap. offense); South Carolina, Code of Laws, 1932, Sec. 1002
(5 each except in murder, manslaughter, burglary, arson, rape, grand
larceny, perjury or forgery).
"Maine, Rev. Stat., 1930, Ch. 96, Sec. 95 (4 each for other offenses);
Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1929, See. 17305 (5 each); Nebraska, Comp.
Stat., 1929, Sec. 29-2005 (6 each if less than life and more than 18
months, 3 each for all other offenses).
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thereof remain involate." Typical is that of North Dakota,
"The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain
inviolate, . . .".12
The advisability of such a provision is manifested in its
wide spread adoption. It exists in 32 states. Kentucky trails
the other 47 states in allowing the defendant 15 and the Com-
monwealth only 5 peremptory challenges. Judges, practicing
lawyers, and Commonwealth attorneys have long since recog-
nized Kentucky's backward position and are urging equality.
That the number provided for by the Model Code is ade-
quate may be seen from a survey of the sections in footnotes
9, 10 and 11.
Ill.
APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT WrINESSES BY THE COURT.
It is recommended tflat Sections 308 and 309 of the Model
Code relating to the appointment of expert witnesses by the
court be adopted in Kentucky.
There are no such provisions in the Kentucky Criminal
Code. Section 156 relating to the impaneling of a special jury
to try the insanity of defendant applies only where insanity has
arisen subsequent to the time of the alleged offense.
Section 308 of the A. L. I. provides:
"Whenever on a prosecution by indictment the existence of in-
sanity or mental defect on the part of the defendant at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense charged becomes an issue in the
cause, the court may appoint one or more disinterested qualified ex-
perts, not exceeding three, to examine the defendant. If the court
does so, the clerk shall notify the prosecuting attorney and counsel
for the defendant of such appointment and shall give the names and
the addresses of the experts so appointed. If the defendant is at large
on bail, the court in its discretion may commit him to custody pend-
ing the examination of such experts. The appointment of experts by
the court shall not preclude the Commonwealth or defendant from
calling expert witnesses to testify at the trial and in case the de-
fendant is committed to custody by the court they shall be permitted
to have free access to the defendant for purposes of examination or
observation. The experts appointed by the court shall be summoned
to testify at the trial and shall be examined by the court and may be
examined by counsel for the Commonwealth and the defendant."
Section 309 provides:
"When expert witnesses are appointed by the court as provided
IsConst., 1889, Art. I, Sec. 7.
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in the preceding section, they shall be allowed such fees as the court
in its discretion deems reasonable having regard to the service per-
formed by the witnesses. The fees so allowed shall be paid by the
[county where the indictment was found].
This portion in brackets was deleted and the words "Com-
monwealth of Kentucky as other court costs are paid", sub-
stituted therein by a vote of the 1935 annual Kentucky State
Bar Association.
There is now no statutory authorization for the payment of
the expert witnesses called by the Commonwealth. It seems to
be the practice in the majority of cases where expert witnesses
are called by the Commonwealth to submit a claim for services
to the fiscal court of the county wherein the indictment was
found, which may allow or refuse the claim. It has then been
recognized that the county is the proper unit to bear the expense.
Although the case is brought in the name of the Commonwealth,
yet looking at the matter realistically, it is the county which is
primarily offended and the county which should bear the expense
of the trial. For that reason the writers feel that Section 309 as
originally stated is to be preferred. It would certainly be in-
consistent to require the State to pay the court's witnesses when
the county pays the State's witnesses. The objection to the
section as originally stated was that an added burden would be
placed upon the county. It is the writers' opinion that such
would not be the result. Where counsel for both sides know that
the court in its discretion may call unbiased and non-partisan
experts in the role of "amici curie" they will be less likely to
call partisan experts whose testimony will be of far less weight
because partisan. Further, the calling of experts rests in the
sound discretion of the court and it is not believed that the
judge, dependent upon the county for reelection, will abuse this
discretionary power.
To realize the crying need of such a provision one has only
to place himself in the predicament of the trial juror where
insanity becomes an issue. Faced by a battery of experts called
by both the Commonwealth and the defendant he can not know
which to believe. At such a point the advice of strictly impar-
tial experts would be a most welcome aid and guide. Realizing
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this need the American Institute of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology some years ago included such a provision in a Model Tes-
timony Bill.13
"Whenever in the trial of a criminal case the issue of insanity on
the part of the defendant is raised, the Judge of the Trial court may
call one or more disinterested qualified experts, not exceeding three,
to testify at the trial, and if the Judge does so, he should notify counsel
of the witnesses so called giving their names and addresses. Upon
the trial of the case the witnesses called by the court may be examined
regarding their qualification and their testimony by the counsel for
the prosecution and defense. Such calling of witnesses by the court
shall not preclude the prosecution or defense from calling other ex-
pert witnesses at the trial. The witnesses called by the Judge shall
be allowed such fees as in the discretion of the Judge seems just and
reasonable having regard to the services performed by the witnesses.
The fees so allowed shall be paid by the county where the indictment
was found."
In a vigorous attack upon the present system Professor Wig-
more said :14
"What, then, is the cause of expert witnesses' partisanship,
If it Is found even where character and reputation exclude the
cause commonly attributed?
"It Is this: the vicious method of the law which permits and
requires each of the opposing parties to summon the witnesses
on the parties' own account."
"The vicious method naturally makes the witness a partisan.
He Is spoken of habitually as 'my' witness or 'our' witness. In
the Leob-Leopold case where the experts devoted long hours to
the study of the defenses' case, consulted only with defenses'
counsel, made preliminary reports to those counsel, cut down those
orginal reports in their testimony, and answered only the ques-
tions that were asked by counsel, it was natural and inevitable
that their testimony should take on a partisan color. Partly this
would be unconscious. Partly it would be conscious, in that they
came to sympathize with the only side known to them and in
that they committed themselves to conclusions which it was hard
to modify when grilled by hostile counsel.
"The method of the law in inherently bad. Its badness has
long been known or suspected. The Leob-Leopold case merely
gave a clear demonstration of it to the eyes of the world.
"What is the remedy? Very simple. Let the expert witness
be summoned by the Court, himself. Let all subsequent proceed-
ings be based on this theory, payment by the State (our italics)-
consultation with counsel on either side if desired,--direct inter-
rogation by the Court and cross-examination by both counsel if
desired,-exchange of views beforehand with other experts, if any.
"This is the only method that will remove the scandal and
mistrust that now attaches so often to expert testimony, whether
in the medical or other sciences."
u Quoted by Keedy, "Insanity and Criminal Responsibility" (1917),
80 Harv. L. Rev. 535, 537, Sec. 1. Summoning of Witnesses by Court.1 1Wigmore, "To abolish Partisanship of Expert Witnesses as
Illustrated in the Loeb-Leopold Case" (1924), 15 Jour. Crim. Law 341,
342.
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Indeed the very essence of scientific testimony should be its
disinterestedness.
The American Bar Association in 1929 passed a far reach-
ing resolution: "That there be available to every criminal and
juvenile court a psychiatric service to assist in the disposition of
criminals."15
IV.
TRIAL wHiPm JOINT DMMNDANTS.
Section 312 of the A. L. I. Code provides:
Where two or more defendants are jointly charged with any
offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they shall be tried jointly
unless the court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecuting
attorney or any defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate
trials, the court may order that one or more defendants be each sepa-
rately tried and the others jointly tried, or may order that several
defendants be jointly tried In one trial and the others jointly tried
in another trial or trials, or may order that each defendant be sepa-
rately tried.
Section 237 of the Kentucky Criminal Code provides:
"If two or more defendants be jointly indicted for a felony any
defendant is entitled to a separate trial."
It is the belief of the writers that a repeal of the later sec-
tion and passage of the Model Code provision would bring about
a much needed reform in our criminal procedure. Useless ex-
pensive trials would be avoided, more uniform justice would be
meted out, and needless delay would be avoided.16
u Am. Bar Assn. Report, 1929, Vol. 54 at p. 56.
25The following letter has been received from Mr. James Park,
Commonwealth's Attorney for Fayette County, and was published in
connection with a previous discussion of this section in 23 Ky. L. Jour.
430, 450:
"With reference to the matter discussed by us several days
ago, I am strongly of the opinion that one of the most helpful
things that could be done to improve criminal procedure in Ken-
tucky would be the passage of an act by the Legislature permitting
defendants, who are jointly indicted in felony eases, to ba tried
together, with the right given to the presiding judge to grant
the separate trial if, in the exercise of his discretion, a separate
trial is necessary in order to give a fair trial to the parties.
"It seems useless, expensive and an ineffective thing to do
in a case where defendants are jointly indicted for felony
that the Commonwealth must present the same witnesses in each
of several trials, with a new jury for each trial, and the result is
often a miscarriage of justice.
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It is believed that the only possible argument that could be
urged against such a provision is that it might subject the in-
nocent defendant indicted jointly with a guilty one to a certain
imputation if culpability from contact with his co-defendant to
which he would not be subject if tried separately. But this
seems unsound. The reasonable doubt necessary for acquittal
of the one would be much more readily created where the other's
guilt is so black and inescapable. White never seems quite so
white as when placed side by side with black. Indeed the ac-
cused has nothing to fear from this score. In extraordinary
cases or where it is evident that all parties will be better served
in separate trials the court in the exercise of its discretion will
grant them.
At common law the Commonwealth and not the defendant,
in cases of joint indictments, had the right of election, subject
to the discretion of the court whether to try defendants jointly
or separately. 17 Ten States now by statute provide that the
granting of separate trials rests in the sound discretion of the
court in all cases.' s
"I recall especially one case where two men were indicted and
charged with the theft of a lot of tobacco. The evidence for the
Commonwealth showed the theft of the tobacco and that the two
defendants together took it by truck to a warehouse, the tobacco
so sold being identified as the stolen tobacco. The defendants
demanded, and as a matter of a right, received separate trials.
Upon the first trial the defendant being tried testified that he
was standing on the street and that the other defendant came
along in the truck with the tobacco and asked him to ride to the
warehouse and help him unload it, and that he was entirely
innocent in the transaction. Upon the later trial of the other he
told the same story, i. e., that he was standing on the street and
the defendant, who was first tried, came along in the truck with
the tobacco and asked him to go along and help unload it. Had
these cases been tried together the jury could have determined
which of the defendants was telling the truth, or could have
reached the conclusion, which I think was the truth, that both of
them were actually engaged in the theft of the tobacco; yet upon
separate trials, there was sufficient doubt thrown in the minds of
the jury as to make a conviction difficult.
"If you can do anything toward having our Code of Criminal
Practice amended so as to make possible the joint trial for de-
fendants who are jointly indicted in felony cases, you will have
made a substantial contribution to the enforcement of law in this
State."
ITHoffman v. Cor., 134 Ky. 726, 733, 121 S. W. 690 (1909); Drake
v. Com., 214 Ky. 147, 151, 282 S. W. 1066 (1926); Geyer and Skinner,
"Proposed Criminal Code Changes for Kentucky," 23 Ky. L. J. 430, 450.
"Caliornia, Penal Code, 1931, Section 1098; Connecticut, Gen.
Stat., 1930, Sections 6529, 6531; Idaho, Code, 1932, Section 19-2006;
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V.
ALIBI OR INSANITY TO BE PLEADED iN ADvANCE.
"Whenever a defendant in a criminal case not cognizable by a
Justice of the Peace shall propose to offer in his defense testimony
to establish an alibi on behalf of the defendant, or of the insanity of
the defendant, either at the time of the alleged offense or at the time
of the trial, such defendant shall at the time of the arraignment or
within ten (10) days thereafter but not less than four (4) days before
the trial of such cause file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney In
such cause a notice in writing of his intention to claim such defense
and in cases of a claimed alibi such notice shall include specific in-
formaton as to the place at which the accused claims to have been
at the time of the alleged offense.
"In the event of the failure of a defendant to file the written
notice prescribed in the preceding section, the court, in its discretion,
may exclude evidence offered by such defendant for the purpose of
establishing an alibi or the insanity of such defendant as set forth in
the preceding section."
At the Crime Conference called by the Attorney General in
Washington on December 10-13, 1934, a resolution recommended
"The adoption of the principle that a criminal defendant offer-
ing a claim of alibi or insanity in his defence shall be required
•to give advance notice to the prosecution of this fact and of the
circumstances to be offered, and that in the absence of such
notice a plea of insanity or a defence based on an alibi shall not
be permitted upon trial except in extraordinary cases in the
discretion of the judge."
A similar provision was recommended in the report of the
Law Reform Committee at the 1934 annual meeting of the Ken-
tucky State Bar Association. 19
In a paper entitled "Necessary changes in the Law of Evi-
dence to Meet Modern Criminal Problems," by Mason Ladd of
the University of Iowa law faculty, read and approved at a
round table discussion at the annual meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools, December 28, 1934, the same rule was
recommended.
Michigan (whose statute is above set out), New Jersey,
Ohio, and Wisconsin have such statutes. 20 A similar bill is now
Louisiana, Code of Cr. Pr., 1932, Section 316 (District Attorney or
Court); Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1929, Section 17298; Nevada, Comp.
Laws, Section 10966; New York, Bender's Cr. Code, 1931, Cr. Pr., Sec-
tion 391; North Dakota, Sess. Laws, 1927, P. 374, Section 10833; South
Dakota, Comp. Laws, 1929, Section 4876; Washington, Pierce's Code,
1929, Section 9377.
"'Proc. Ky. State Bar Assn. (1934), p. 208.
"Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1929, Sees. 17313, 17314; New Jersey, see
"The Justinian" published by the Brooklyn Law School for Feb. 31,
1935; Ohio, Gen. Code, 1932, Sec. 13444-20.
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pending before the New York legislature. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court under.authority of Section 251.18 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes, 1929,21 adopted the following rule, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1935:
"Alibi to be pleaded. In courts of record in case the defendant
intends to rely upon a alibi as a defense he shall give the prosecuting
attorney written notice thereof on the day of arraignment, stating
particularly the place he claims to have been when the offense is
alleged to have been committed; in default of such notice, evidence of
the alibi shall not be received unless the courts, for good cause shown
shall otherwise order."Is
It is to be noted that the Wisconsin rule applies only to alibi
and not to the defense of insanity. For this reason it is sub-
mitted that the Michigan act is much better, for the arguments
in favor of advance notice of alibi apply with the same force to
the defense of insanity.
The adoption of such a rule would be a decided step for-
ward in the campaign of criminal law reform. It prevents im-
position upon the court and jury, it tends to sever the "Shyster-
Criminal" combine, and it will prevent the evasion of the
penalty of the law by some fraudulently concocted alibi.
Evidence of an alibi or plea of insanity has been the resort
of many criminals where there could not be raised otherwise any
doubt of the identification of the offenders. Evidence of an alibi
has usually been offered at the very end of the defense when
there remained no time for the prosecution to investigate its good
faith or the character of the witnesses produced and has often
resulted in the acquittal of the guilty.
CONCLUSION
It is the writers' conviction that each of these provisions
represents a decided improvement over the present practice and
that each has been carefully selected to meet an immediate and
pressing need. It is to be hoped that the interest manifested in
this report at the 1935 annual meeting of The Kentucky State
Bar Assiciation will result in a concerted effort towards the
enactment of these recommendations as law by the General As-
sembly7 of 1936.
2 Upheld, In re Constitutionality of Section 251, 18 Wisconsin
Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W. 717 (1931).
"Wisconsin arraignment corresponds to a preliminary examina-
tion and is held before the county judge. See Wis. Stat., Sec. 357, 20-24.
